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WORLD LAW
We return in this issue to a primary function of this section of the
Journal, that of presenting current information, not excluding commen-
tary, regarding the judgments, important orders, and advisory opinions
of the World Court. There follow, accordingly, digests of two recent
World Court judgments, the one disposing of preliminary objections
by Thailand to the jurisdiction of the Court in the Case Concerning the
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), rendered 26 May
19615 the other the final judgment in the Case Concerning the Arbitral
Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 19o6 (Honduras v.
Nicaragua), rendered 18 November 196o.
These two judicial pronouncements, both dealing with border prob-
lems, present a number of noteworthy circumstances. Both parties in
both cases have accepted the "ipso facto and without special agreement"
jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute.
Incidentally, in both cases each side retained of counsel a renowned
United States lawyer. In both cases the Court reached unanimous con-
currence, save for the ad hoc judge of the losing party in the latter.
In the former, the parties, though the personnel of the Court contained
a national of neither, did not avail themselves of the provisions of
Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Court, enabling each to
"choose a person to sit as judge." In this respect they followed the
example of Belgium and the Netherlands in the Case Concerning Sover-
eignty over Certain Frontier Land,' previously digested in this section.2
It seems pertinent to remark that the foregoing facts appear to add point
to the frequent criticism of the institution of litigant-nation appointees
to the World Court bench in particular cases, as an anachronism and as
inconsistent with the fundamental principle of third-party judgment.
The Temple of Preakh Vihear case further presents the interesting
circumstance of defendant's essential reliance upon the judgment of the
Court in 1959 in the Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of July 27,
1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria)3 to render ineffective its declaration of 195o
recognizing the Court's jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2. In
that judgment the Court had held that a state becoming party to the
present Statute, by virtue of membership in the United Nations acquired
x959] I.C.J. Rep. 209.
2 196o DUKE L.J. 252.
[1959] .CJ. Rep. 127.
CAMBODIA v. THAILAND
in 1955, did not thereby accept compulsory jurisdiction.by virtue of
Article 36, paragraph 5,' though it had, at the time of the expiration of
the Statute of the predecessor Permanent Court of International Justice,
accepted such jurisdiction without time limit under that Statute. It is
perhaps the most clear-cut attempt to date, by a litigant before the
World Court, to base its case upon a previous decision of the Court.
The Court, however, sharply distinguished the previous facts and cir-
cumstances from those presently before it and sustained its jurisdiction
to proceed to the merits in the later case.5
The King of Spain's arbitral award, the subject-matter of the other
case here digested, had been made more than half a century previously,
but had not been carried into effect by the party (Nicaragua) obligated
by it to do so. Honduras sought and obtained the judgment of the
World Court to bring about such fulfillment. While in no technical
sense an appeal or an application for Mandamus, the stated competence
of the Court not extending to either appellate or injunctive jurisdiction,
the actual outcome in some respects resembles both kinds of relief and
perhaps suggests useful lines of development for the jurisdiction of the
Court in the future.
-The Editors
CAMBODIA v. THAILAND:6 PRELIMINARY
OBJECTIONS
THE DisPUTE before the World Court in this case grew out of the
conflicting claims of the parties to the ownership of the region of the
Temple of Preah Vihear on their joint frontier. It is, as the Court
" "Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties
to the present statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run and in accordance
with their terms."
It is to be expected that the judgment on the Merits, if and when made, will be
reported in this section of the JOURNAL.
a Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Prelimi-
nary Objections, [196i] I.C.J. Rep. 17.
The Court was composed of President Winiarski; Vice-President Alfaro5 Judges
Badawi, Moreno Quintana, Wellington Koo, Spiropoulos, Sir Percy Spender, Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice, Koretsky, Tanaka, Bustamante y Rivero, and Morelli.
Cambodia is one of the small minority of states recently admitted to the United
Nations that have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court under Art. 36, paragraph z,
of the Statute.
The English text of the judgment is authentic.
Vol. z961: 538"1
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
says, "a dispute about territorial sovereignty."17  Plaintiff based its invo-
cation of the jurisdiction of the Court upon the combined effect of its
own acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction by declaration dated 9 Sep-
tember 1957,8 coupled with the declaration made by Thailand on 2o
May I95O- Cambodia also relied upon certain treaty provisions"0
entered into between France acting on behalf of the former territory of
French Indo-China (of which Cambodia had been a component part)
and Siam (Thailand). However, the Court, after considering the pre-
liminary objections of Thailand was able to come to a decision on the
former basis alone, and did not pass upon the latter. In as much as
Thailand had raised the objections mentioned, denying that the Court
had jurisdiction to decide the case, the Court's task in the present pro-
ceedings was limited to determining whether or not it possessed compe-
tence to hear the case on the merits.
Thailand excepted to Cambodia's claim that the declaration of 20
May 1950 constituted a valid acceptance by Thailand of compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court. "It is solely the validity of Thailand's Decla-
ration that is in issue in the present proceedings."' 1
Thailand had accepted compulsory jurisdiction in 1929 and renewed
its acceptance in 1940. The 195o declaration, quoted by the Court,12
'Id. at 22.
8 [1959-i96o] I.CJ. Y.B. 236. Article 36, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 states:
". The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize
as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes
concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation 5
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an interna-
tional obligation.
"3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of
reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain time.
"4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations
who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of
the Court."
Id. at 25., & n.2.
'0 General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (26 Sept., 1958),
93 L.N.T.S. 343; 4 Hudson 2529. See also Franco-Siamese Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation (7 Dec., 1937), 2o L.N.T.S. 129.
11 [196o] I.CJ. Rep. z3.
1" ,"I have the honour to inform you that by a declaration dated September 2o, 19292
His Majesty's Government had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent
Court of International justice in conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute
[Vol. i96i: 538
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was in form a renewal of the earlier ones. Thailand now contended that
since, subsequent to the declaration of i95o, there had intervened the
judgment of the Court in Israel v. Bulgaria,'3 the language of that
declaration, having been based on assumptions shown by that judgment
to have been incorrect, had become meaningless. The defendant state,
however, in no way denied that, by its declaration of 1950, it fully in-
tended to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court; that is, the
International Court of Justice created under the Statute annexed to
the Charter of the United Nations effective in 1945. But defendant
argued that its intention, though clearly existent, was never carried out
as a matter of objective fact because it had all unwittingly drafted the
declaration in terms which subsequent events-particularly the Court's
decisions just above mentioned-revealed as having been ineffectual to
achieve its purpose. Drafted as a renewal it could not operate as an
original declaration of acceptance.
The Court began its discussion by analyzing Article 36, paragraph
5,14 of its Statute, the intention of which was to provide a means whereby,
within certain limits, existing declarations of acceptance of the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the former Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice would become ipso jure transformed into acceptances of the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the present Court, as respects states parties to the
present Statute, without having to make new declarations. In Israel v.
Bulgaria, however, the Court had held that Article 36, paragraph 5,
did not apply indiscriminately to all States which, having accepted compulsory
the jurisdiction of the former Permanent Court, might at any subsequent date
become parties to the Statute of the Court, but only to such States as were
original parties. The Court furthermore came to the conclusion that on I9
April 1946, the date when the Permanent Court ceased to exist, all declara-
tions in acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court
for a period of ten years and on condition of reciprocity. That declaration has been
renewed on May 30, 1940, for another period of ten years.
"In accordance with the provisions of Article 36, paragraph 4, of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, I have now the honour to inform you that His Majesty's
Government hereby renew the declaration above mentioned for a further period of ten
years as from May 3, 195o, with the limits and subject to the same conditions and
reservations as set forth in thefirst declaration of Sept. 2o 19292' Id. at 24.
The conditions and reservations mentioned were irrevelant to the present proceeding
before the Court. Paragraph 4 relates to the deposit of declarations with the Secretary-
General.
The 1929 declaration is set forth at page 23 of the instant opinion.
" Note 3, supra.
' For text see note 4, supra.
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which had not already, by then, been "transformed" by the operation of
Article 36, paragraph 5, into acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
present Court, lapsed and ceased to be in force, since they would, as from then,
have related to a tribunal-the former Permanent Court-which no longer
existed. Consequently, so the Court found, all declarations not having been
thus transformed by 19 April 1946 ceased as from that date to be susceptible of
the process of transformation ipso jure provided by Article 36, paragraph 515
It followed that Thailand, not having been an Original Party to the
Charter and not having become a Member of the United Nations until
after i9 April 1946, could not, by virtue of Article 36, paragraph 5
(applicable only to declarations "still in force"), have transformed any
acceptance of jurisdiction and could not in 195o have extended its i94o
renewal of its acceptance of 1929, which acceptance and renewal had
ceased to have any reality when the "old" Court ceased to be. The
renewal of an instrument relating only to a non-existent institution was
necessarily devoid of legal effect. Whatever its intentions, Thailand
accordingly claimed, its declaration of i95o could not have been an
acceptance of jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute,
any more than the intentions of a testator could prevail legally if his will
were not in the form which the law prescribed.
The Court did not share Thailand's view that its decision in Israel v.
Bulgaria wiped out the intended effect of Thailand's 195o declaration,
namely to accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.
Pointing out that a "decision of the Court has no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case,1" the
Court noted that Israel v. Bulgaria could not in any event have had the
effect of invalidating Thailand's 195o declaration. Its relevancy in
Cambodia v. Thailand lay in its statements of the scope of Article 36,
paragraph 5, which was found to relate solely to cases in which declara-
tions accepting the jurisdiction of the "old" Court would be deemed to
be transformed into acceptances of that of the "new" court, "without
any new or specific act on the part of the declarant State other than the
act of having become a party to the [latter Court's] Statute."' 7 Clearly
Thailand's "new and voluntary act," that is, its declaration of 20 May
1950, placed it "in a different position from Bulgaria which had never
taken any new step at all"' 8 subsequent to its admission to the United
Nations.
"' [i96o] I.CJ. Rep. 25.
'" Statute, Art. 59.
[196o] I.C.J. Rep. 27.
1 Id. at 28.
[Vol. 1961 :53 8
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Thailand became a Member of the United Nations in December
19465 its declaration of 194o, incapable of transformation under Article
36, paragraph 5, expired according to its own terms on 6 May 1950,
fourteen days before Thailand's "new step" taken for the purpose of
accepting the present Court's jurisdiction, hence could never thereafter
be transformed as such into-an acceptance binding upon Thailand. On
20 May 195o Thailand was thus completely free to accept or not to accept
the jurisdiction of the Court for the future. By its declaration of that
date, addressed to the Secretary-General in accordance with Article 36,
paragraph 4 of the Statute, Thailand "at least-purported to accept, and
dearly intended to accept"' 9 such jurisdiction. The "sole pertinent
question in this case," 20 therefore, was whether by the declaration of
195o Thailand effectually carried out this intention.
The relevancy of the Israel v. Bulgaria decision derived from its
dear negativing of any connection between Article 36, paragraph 5, and
Thailand's declaration of 2o May 1950, with the result that the decla-
ration must be deemed to have been made under Article 36, paragraphs
2_4,21 and to constitute an independent acceptance of the Court's jurisdic-
tion by means of the normal procedure there set forth. The invocation
of the decision by Thailand as the basis of the argument that its 194o
renewal of its declaration of 1929 was continued by the declaration of
1950, which latter, accordingly, could relate only to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the "old" Court, was found not to be well taken. The
principal juridical relevance of such an error as Thailand may have
committed in preparing its declaration of 1950 would derive from the
fact that the error might affect the reality of the consent supposed to
have been given. The Court was unable to see in Thailand's case iny
factor which could, ex post and retroactively, impair the reality of the
consent that Thailand admitted and affirmed to have been fully intended
in 1950, namely consent to the compulsory jurisdiction of the present
Court. Thailand could hardly, under any conceivable supposition, have
intended to consent in 1950 to the jurisdiction of the "old" Court which
Thailand knew to have ceased to exist in 1946.
The crux of the matter lay in the question whether the declaration
of 1950, though in form a renewal, could accomplish a de novo accept-
ance of jurisdiction. The "sheer impossibility," said the Court, "that, in
1950, any acceptance could either have been intended, or could in fact
" Id. at 29.
20 Ibid.
21 Textually set forth at note 8 supra.
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have operated, as an acceptance relative to the Permanent Court is a
factor to be borne in mind in considering the effect of the I95o Decla-
ration."2" The Court then noted that in the field of domestic private
law, for example the law of wills, formalities are prescribed as essential
to the validity of certain transactions. Legal requirement of stated form
is the essence of the matter. "Where, on the other hand, as is generally
the case in international law, which places the principal emphasis on the
intentions of the parties, the law prescribes no particular form, parties
are free to choose what form they please provided their intention dearly
results from it."23 In the present case the only required formality for
accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction is the deposit of a declara-
tion with the Secretary-General.24 This formality was accomplished by
Thailand.
Applying the ordinary canons of interpretation 25 to Thailand's decla-
ration of 1950, the Court was further confirmed in its finding of the
validity thereof as an acceptance of its own compulsory jurisdiction. The
Court continued:
To sum up, when a country has evinced as clearly as Thailand did in
195o, and indeed by its consistent attitude over many years, an intention to
submit itself to the compulsory jurisdiction of what constituted at the time
the principal international tribunal, the Court could not accept the plea that
this intention had been defeated and nullified by some defect not involving
any flaw in the consent given, unless it could be shown that this defect was
so fundamental that it vitiated the instrument by failing to conform to some
mandatory legal requirement. The Court does not consider that this was the
case and it is the duty of the Court not to allow the clear purpose of a party
to be defeated by reason of possible defects which, in the general context, in
no way affected the substance of the matter, and did not cause the instrument
to run counter to any mandatory requirement of law.
The Court therefore considers that the reference in the Declaration of
1950 to paragraph 4 of Article 36 of the Statute gave the Declaration ...
the character of an acceptance under paragraph 2 of that Article. Such an
acceptance could only have been an acceptance in relation to the present Court.
22 [196o] I.C.J. Rep. 32.
Ibid.
24Art. 36, paragraph 4. Note also paragraph z.
2' Regarding these canons of interpretation the Court cited the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.
case, [952] I.C.J. Rep. 104, and the case of the Polish Postal Service in Danzig,
P.C.I.J., Series b, No. 11, P.39. They are also comprehensively discussed in the recent
advisory opinion of the Court in the Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of
the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization case [296o] I.C.J. Rep.
x5o, reported in 1961 DUKE LoJ. 288.
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The remainder of the Declaration must be construed in the light of that cardi-
nal fact, and in the general context of the Declaration; and the reference to
the 1929 and 194o Declarations must, as was clearly intended, be regarded
simply as being a convenient method of indicating without stating them in
terms, what were the conditions upon-which the acceptance was made. 26
Thus the Court rejected the preliminary objection of Thailand and
found that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute submitted to it
on 6 October I959 by the application of Cambodia.
The finding of the Court was unanimous. Vice-President Alfaro and
Judge Wellington Koo appended declarations to the effect that their
concurrence must not be construed as concurrence in the judgment of
the Court in Israel v. Bulgaria. Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and
Judge Tanaka made a joint declaration in which they included the
following:
Since . . . the objection [of Thailand] necessarily presupposes the correct-
ness of the conclusion reached in the Israel v. Bulgaria case, the view that
this conclusion was in fact incorrect would, for any one holding that view,
furnish a further reason for rejecting the objection, and a much more imme-
diate one than any of those contained in the present Judgment.
This is precisely our position since, to our regret, we are unable to agree
with the conclusion which the Court reached in the Israel v. Bulgaria case as
to the effect of Article 36, paragraph 5, of the Statute. We need not give
our reasons for this, for they are substantially the same as those set out in the
Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Sir Hersch Lauterpacht and Sir Percy
Spender, and of Judge Wellington Koo .... 27
Judge Sir Percy Spender and Judge Morelli appended separate opinions.
Judge Spender, who had joined in a dissenting opinion in Israel v.
Bulgaria, found the task of asserting jurisdiction in the present case a
simple one. He did not think there was any doubt that Thailand's
belief as of 2o May 1950 was as stated by it. That belief "accorded with
the view commonly held at that time as to the meaning and effect of
Article 36, paragraph 5.'' 28 The terms of Thailand's letter of that date
to the Secretary-General were not reasonably consistent with any other
conclusion. There were no requirements of form for the recognition
of the Court's jurisdiction. The letter should be so interpreted as to
20 [196o] I.C.J. Rep. 34.
"Id. at 37. The joint declaration also discussed briefly Thailand's second pre-
liminary objection, in the course of whiclh id at 38, reference was made to the view
expressed by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in the case of South West Africa Voting Procedure,
[x9s5] I.C.J. Rep. at 90-93.
8 1d. at 39.
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harmonize with, not to thwart, the purpose Thailand had at that time.
The words of the letter were intended to indicate that the declaration
accepting the jurisdiction of the "old" Court had been transformed,
upon Thailand's becoming in 1946 a party to the neW Statute, into
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the "new" Court by virtue of the opera-
tion of Article 36, paragraph 5, of the new Statute. The 195o declara-
tion was drafted, indeed, after Thailand had received a letter from the
Registrar of the Court, calling attention to its declaration of 1940, "con-
sidered as being still in force (Article 36, paragraph 5, of the Statute of
the present Court)," by which declaration Thailand "recognized as com-
pulsory the jurisdiction of the [present] Court in the circumstances
provided for in Article 36 ... ,19 The Registrar added that the accept-
ance of 1940, which was valid for a period of ten years, would expire
on 2 May 1950.
Adhering as he did to the dissenting opinion referred to, Judge
Spender had no difficulty in finding that Thailand's letter of 2o May
1950 was a valid declaration of acceptance under Article 36, paragraph 2,
of the present Statute. The use of the word renew was only natural
under the circumstances.
Judge Morelli considered that it would have been preferable for the
Court to concentrate upon what he believed to be the essential point in
the contention of Thailand as presented in the preliminary objections,
namely, that the 195o declaration, purporting to renew for a further
period of ten years Thailand's declaration of 1929, was "wholly ineffec-
tive" because the declaration of 1929, renewed by that of 194o, had
lapsed on the dissolution of the "old" Court, 19 April 1946 accordingly
the I95o declaration had done nothing but attempt to renew what could
not be renewed because non-existent, and so was devoid of legal effect.
He devoted a meticulous analysis of Thailand's statement of its case to
an exposure of the incorrectness of this contention deduced from the
Court's Israel v. Bulgaria holding (1959).
Calling attention to a "quite different" contention advanced by Thai-
land in the oral proceedings, namely that the i95o declaration pur-
ported to maintain in force the 1929-1940 obligation to submit to the
"old" Court's jurisdiction in order to achieve through Article 36, para-
graph 5, acceptance of the jurisdiction of the "new" Court, Judge
Morelli pronounced this latter contention "ictu oculi unfounded."30 He
listed as reasons: (a) the reference in the 195o declaration to Article 36,
29 Id. at 41.
Iod. at 44.
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paragraph 4, of the new statute proves that that declaration is made on
the basis of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the new Statute; (b) the absurd-
ity of the idea of seeking by indirection what could so simply have been
achieved by an application based on Article 36, paragraph 2; (c) the
impossibility of the proposition, since Article 36, paragraph 5, refers to
earlier declarations and does not contemplate a declaration made sub-
sequent to the date of the present statute.
Referring to Thailand's statement above mentioned, Judge Morelli
asserted that acceptance of the Court's 1959 interpretation of Article 36,
paragraph 5, entailed denial that the clause was operative with respect
to the Thailand 195o declaration; in this respect the position of Thai-
land must be considered analogous to that of Bulgaria. So far as con-
cerns Cambodia v. Thailand, and generally in case of a declaration
renewing an earlier declaration, the relationship between the two decla-
rations must be determined. The new declaration, just because it is a
new one, is independent, even though its content is determined by
reference to the earlier. Such reference need not bring about identity
of content. The very idea of renewal implies some difference in the
matter of time factors. Thus,
the moment from which the new declaration begins to produce its effects does
not need to coincide with the moment when the effects of the earlier declara-
tion cease. On the contrary, it is quite possible for a declaration which states
the intention to "renew" an earlier declaration to date the beginning of its
effects from a moment subsequent to that at which the effects of the renewed
declaration terminated; the consequence of this is to break the continuity of
the periods covered by the two declarations. In the same way, the effects of
the new declaration may begin before the moment stated in the earlier declara-
ration as the moment at which its effects are to terminate; in other words, the
new declaration may replace the declaration that it is renewing for a portion
of the latter's duration.
This is the situation in the present case. The declaration of 3 May 1940,
renewing the declaration of 20 September 1929 for a ten-year period as from
7 May 1940, expired on 6 May 1950. Yet the declaration of 20 May 1950
renewed the declaration of 1929 for a further period of ten years as from 3
May 1950.81
A renewal, rightly so termed, may, moreover, depart from the renewed
instrument in other ways: for instance, that of 195o relates to the juris-
diction of the present Court, that of 1929 to the "old" Court. It is
possible to renew a declaration which, because void, has never produced
d1 . at 47.
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any effects, as well as one which is no longer in force at the time of
renewal.
Prior to the time when Thailand's 195o declaration became ineffec-
tive, the previous declarations had come to an end; this would have been
true even if Article 36, paragraph 5, had been operative with respect to
it. The fact was well known to Thailand that when the 195o declara-
tion became effective that the declaration desired to be renewed had
ceased to be in force.
Accordingly Thailand's argument based on the impossibility of re-
newing the declarations accepting the jurisdiction of the "old" Court
by means of the declaration of 1950 is without foundation. By that
declaration Thailand accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice, the "new court," but on conditions determinable by reference
to the "old" Court declarations.
HONDURAS v. NICARAGUA"
Though both parties accepted the jurisdiction of the World Court
pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Court's Statute,N plaintiff,
in instituting the present case, relied on the Washington Agreement of
21 July I95734 between the parties with regard to the procedure to be
followed in submitting the dispute to the Court. The following sub-
mission in plaintiff's Application, quoted in the Court's judgment, 5
indicates the nature of the controversy:
May it please the Court:
To adjudge and declare, whether the Government of Nicaragua appears
or not, after considering the contentions of the Parties:
i. that failure of the Government of Nicaragua to give effect to the arbitral
award made on 23 December 19o6 by His Majesty the King of Spain
constitutes a breach of an international obligation within the meaning of
32 [ig6o] I.C.J. Rep. 192. The date of the arbitral award was 23 Dec. 19o6; that
of the Court's judgment, i Nov. 196o. The Court was composed of President Klaestad,
Vice-President Zafrulla Khan, Judges Hackworth, Winiarski, Badawi, Armand-Ugon,
Kojevnikov, Moreno Quintana, C6rdova, Wellington Koo, Spiropoulos, Sir Percy
Spender, and Alfaro, Judges ad hoc Ago and Urrutia Holguin. Of counsel for Nicaragua
in this case was M. Gaetano Morelli, who, subsequently elected to the Court, delivered
the separate (concurring) opinion in Cambodia 'v. Thailand, digested just above.
:3 See [1959-6o] I.C.J. Y.B. 24., 247.
, 277 U.N.T.S. .59, No. 4005 (Effective 21 July 1957).
si i6o] I.C.J. Rep. x95.
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